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Introduction 
In the face of large and growing 
budget deficits, finding ways to bend 
the health care cost curve and 
improve the efficiency of the 
Medicare program has been a central 
focus of budget policy. Medicare 
spends more than $500 billion 
annually for more than 46 million 
senior and disabled beneficiaries,1 
and research suggests new medical 
technologies2 such as drugs, devices, 
diagnostics and surgical techniques 
are a major driver of increasing costs. 
For example, some novel anti-cancer 
drugs now cost significantly more 
than older alternatives,3 many new 
diagnostic technologies are additive 
rather than replacing outmoded or 
older services,4 and advances in 
minimally invasive surgical 
techniques have substantially 
expanded the number of people who 
are now surgical candidates.5 Within 
the fee-for-service environment, 
which makes up the vast majority of 
Medicare spending, there are few 
incentives to be efficient or 
economical. While some advances in 
medicine undoubtedly have 
contributed to reductions in 
morbidity and mortality, new 
technology and new uses of 
established technology are often 
adopted with little evidence that they 
work better than existing treatments. 
There is even less evidence about 
which patients might actually be 
harmed by their use.  
Coverage policy examines the 
clinical evidence to decide which 
services and treatments should be 
paid for by insurance and under what 
circumstances. Medicare coverage 
determinations can act as a policy 
lever to influence both the 
appropriate use of medical 
technology and the creation of better 
evidence to support clinical and 
health policy decisions.  
Currently, Medicare defers most 
coverage decisions to regional 
contractors who process claims on a 
daily basis. The emphasis of these 
contractors’ work is on efficiently 
processing claims rather than 
accurately evaluating clinical 
effectiveness or appropriateness of 
the services provided. There is also a 
dearth of information available to the 
contractors about the details of these 
services, leading to missed 
opportunities to prevent ineffective, 
unproven and/or harmful 
technologies from widespread 
adoption, at a significant cost to the 
program. Even when national 
policies are developed, the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) and the administrative 
contractors often lack the resources 
to assure that the policies are 
implemented as written. Dependent 
on research performed by other 
agencies, CMS often must make 
coverage policy decisions while 
lacking high-priority, clinical 
research relevant to the Medicare 
population. In essence, CMS is 
precluded from taking action to 
restrict the coverage of services that 
do not provide added value to 
patients when compared to available 
alternatives that are sometimes less 
expensive.  
The four authors of this paper have 
each been senior officials at CMS 
with direct responsibility for core 
aspects of coverage and payment 
policy. The observations presented 
here reflect our consensus viewpoint 
on how things now work at CMS and 
how they might be altered. We 
support our observations and 
recommendations with evidence and 
opinion provided by other experts in 
this field.  
This paper’s premise is that the 
process for making coverage 
decisions in Medicare falls short of 
its potential to contribute to the 
recently articulated “Triple Aim” of 
the program to (1) improve the 
individual experience of care, (2) 
improve the health of populations, 
and (3) reduce per capita costs of 
care for populations.6 Most Triple 
Aim attention has been focused on 
how organizations providing health 
services can be encouraged to 
become Triple Aim “integrators” on 
behalf of the populations they serve. 
That is the role of accountable care 
organizations, as envisioned by the 
Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA). However, payers 
can also play a decisive role in 
promoting Triple Aim objectives. 
While a broad policy audience may 
consider policy about coverage and 
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payment of technology a technical 
aspect of program administration 
with little direct relevance to 
beneficiary well-being and the 
financial status of the Medicare 
program, the authors argue that 
Medicare coverage and payment 
policies for new technology represent 
a fertile mechanism through which to 
achieve the Triple Aim.  
This paper provides a basic overview 
of the coverage policy process at 
CMS; explores particular operational 
deficiencies in current 
implementation; and discusses a few, 
selected opportunities to better align 
coverage policy with the Triple Aim. 
It concludes with high-priority 
recommendations for reform. Some 
changes could be relatively easy to 
implement with sufficient leadership, 
political will and adequate 
administrative resources. Other 
changes would require more 
significant and politically difficult 
actions dependent on affirmative 
congressional authority that does not 
now exist. These more ambitious 
recommendations are made 
anticipating that any fundamental 
reconsideration and possible 
restructuring of the Medicare 
program should thoroughly review 
the current limitations in the CMS 
coverage process.  
This paper does not explore all 
aspects of Medicare’s potential to 
influence the use of technologies. For 
example, many believe that patients 
should be more fully engaged than 
they are currently with their health 
professionals in shared decision-
making about when and how to apply 
available technology in their 
particular circumstances. Approaches 
to achieving shared decision-making, 
such as with accountable care 
organizations and patient-centered 
medical homes, are beyond the scope 
of this paper. Nor does it explore 
provider payment incentives, which 
surely affect the use and the costs 
associated with technology. The 
decision on whether to employ an 
available technology is an inherently 
different decision than determining 
whether the technology should be 
made available and paid for by the 
program and whether any restrictions 
should be placed on that coverage. 
The focus of this paper is the process 
of making coverage policies, not 
Medicare’s influence on health 
professionals and their patients’ 
decisions to use covered items and 
services.  
How the Medicare 
Coverage and Payment 
Process for New 
Technology Works 
The original statutory language that 
established Medicare in 1965 
instructed what eventually became 
the CMS policy not to pay for 
services that were “not reasonable 
and necessary for the diagnosis or 
treatment of illness or injury or to 
improve the functioning of a 
malformed body member.”7 
Although Congress determines the 
broad categories of services 
beneficiaries can receive—e.g., 
inpatient hospital services and 
durable medical equipment—CMS 
controls when to pay for specific 
items and services through its 
coverage process.  
Operationally, coverage 
determinations are reserved for those 
services that are likely to have a 
major impact on cost or quality of 
care or when safety concerns arise. 
Most services provided in Medicare 
do not require a formal coverage 
determination.8 One important reason 
is that Medicare’s prospective 
payment systems for some 
providers—e.g., diagnosis-related 
groups for inpatient care and 
ambulatory service payment 
categories for outpatient hospital 
care—allow payment for incremental 
improvements relying on new 
technology.9 In those cases, the 
recipient of the prospective payment 
assumes responsibility for deciding 
whether and how to provide specific 
services. In essence, the provider 
determines coverage within the 
constraints of the fixed prospective 
payment.10 For example, pulse 
oximetry, a device that provides real-
time information about the oxygen 
content of the blood and obviated the 
need for complicated blood tests with 
delayed feedback, was adopted 
rapidly by hospitals with no need for 
a coverage determination.  
As noted previously, even for items 
bundled into a prospective payment 
system, CMS may choose to make a 
coverage determination for an 
individual service where there is a 
cost, quality or safety concern. As an 
illustration, lung-volume reduction 
surgery used for treating emphysema 
was initially used in some hospitals 
and paid for under a nonspecific 
billing code for multiple resections of 
the lung tissue. When evidence 
surfaced that the surgery might 
increase the risk of death, CMS 
initiated a formal coverage policy.11 
Other examples in recent years 
include implantable cardioverter 
defibrillators (ICDs), carotid artery 
stents and left ventricular assist 
devices. Still, only a small percentage 
of major new technologies are 
subject to explicit local or national 
coverage policies (described below).  
Local Coverage 
Providers file claims through 14 local 
administrative contractors, which 
adjudicate them and often decide 
whether the items and services for 
which they are submitted are, in fact, 
eligible for payment.12 As noted in 
the introduction, while CMS has 
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overall responsibility for determining 
which services to cover,13 these 
regional, administrative contractors 
are commonly faced with making 
payment decisions that grant, limit or 
exclude items and services from 
Medicare on a day-by-day basis.14 
Depending on the service considered, 
local coverage determinations are 
made by the contractors with an 
evidence base that ranges from no 
evidence at all to peer-reviewed 
randomized controlled trials.15 In 
addition, there has been considerable 
variation in local contractor coverage 
of services, although this variation 
may have been reduced as 
contractors have consolidated into 
fewer, regional administrators in 
recent years. While uneven coverage 
policies allow more rapid patient 
access and enable practitioners to 
gain experience with new 
technologies in some areas of the 
country, some argue that a national 
program should not allow significant 
geographic differences in which 
services beneficiaries can receive.16 
Whatever the merits of permitting 
geographic variation in coverage, 
Medicare’s ability to establish 
scientifically based coverage of new 
technologies diminishes when they 
are considered ad hoc through local 
policy-making. 
National Coverage 
CMS develops national coverage 
determinations (NCDs) on a 
relatively small subset of 
technologies. For example, CMS can 
initiate NCDs when there are 
particular concerns about 
technologies or services that may 
have significant quality or safety 
effects on the Medicare population, 
as was done when there were 
indications for increased mortality 
risk with the use of erythropoiesis-
stimulating agents to promote red 
blood cell production in cancer 
patients. In addition, an individual or 
organization with a particular interest 
in a technology, including 
manufacturers, providers, 
beneficiaries and even Congress, may 
seek a policy to provide coverage 
nationally. For example, a 
manufacturer initiated the request to 
greatly expand the approved 
coverage of ICDs to include 
preventive use to protect patients 
from potentially fatal arrhythmias. 
Overall, the portfolio of topics that 
undergoes formal NCD review is a 
mixture of items and services for 
which there is no readily apparent 
programmatic or public health 
strategy. Over the past decade, CMS 
has issued 10 to 15 NCDs per year.17  
CMS is required to use a formal and 
transparent process to make coverage 
determinations, with reliance on a 
review of the best available evidence 
about the effectiveness of the 
technology under consideration. It 
can also seek expert advice from the 
Medicare Evidence Development and 
Coverage Advisory Committee 
(MEDCAC), which consists of 100 
experts in medicine, biological and 
physical sciences, public health 
administration, patient advocacy, 
health care data and information 
management and analysis, health care 
economics, and medical ethics. CMS 
also convenes smaller groups of 
content experts for deliberation on 
specific topics.  
Despite these procedures designed to 
improve CMS’s ability to make 
informed decisions about the 
underlying value of a technology, 
researchers have found that most of 
the time, NCDs that contained a 
positive decision to provide coverage 
for a new service or new clinical 
indication for an established service 
were based on “fair” or “poor” 
evidence.18 The reality is that CMS 
cannot simply defer a decision on 
technology while waiting for “good” 
or “excellent” evidence to be 
produced. In these cases, CMS staff 
has determined that the purported, 
potential benefits of proposed 
technologies and services to improve 
beneficiaries’ health and well-being 
are adequate to support coverage 
even in the absence of satisfactory 
scientific evidence that the proposed 
technology works as claimed. This 
attitude stems in part from the desire 
to provide beneficiaries access to 
potentially beneficial technologies 
without the lengthy delays needed to 
design, fund and implement clinical 
studies after their regulatory 
approval. However, it sometimes 
derives from political pressure from 
affected stakeholders, such as device 
and drug manufactures, clinicians 
and patient advocacy groups. 
The lack of high-quality evidence for 
making informed coverage decisions 
means that the vast majority of new 
technologies and services bypass any 
meaningful review. This is 
exacerbated by the absence of a 
coherent policy framework for 
activating the NCD process 
nationally. The relatively small 
number of issues that are addressed 
through NCDs do not reflect 
predefined policy priorities or public 
health objectives oriented to the core 
aim of improving population health. 
Further, the NCD process has only 
rarely been used proactively as a 
mechanism either to increase the use 
of high-value services that have been 
underused, such as when the CMS 
approved coverage of smoking 
cessation programs,19 or to reduce the 
use of services that are obsolete or 
harmful, as in the case of an NCD 
that denied payment for wrong 
surgery or surgery on the wrong 
patient.20  
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In 2008, Medicare published a list of 
20 technologies about which 
sufficient uncertainty existed, 
prompting CMS to consider a NCD 
review.21 However, despite the 
substantial health and economic 
implications of the services identified 
on this list, action was taken on only 
a few items. Due to a lack of 
resources and changing leadership, 
the list has never been updated or 
expanded. Similarly, despite a few 
recent broad programmatic initiatives 
to promote the development and use 
of high-value innovations—including 
providing clearer guidance regarding 
coverage and payment for 
pharmacogenomic testing and 
initiating an effort to adopt a 
streamlined Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA)-CMS parallel 
review process (see box to the 
right)—these efforts have not 
signaled a sustained effort in any of 
these areas and there is little concrete 
evidence of positive impact.  
Pricing for Covered Services 
 Once an item or service is covered, 
the next step is to determine the 
appropriate price or method for 
reimbursement. The amount paid by 
Medicare for many services is 
determined by formulas that consider 
cost or resource use, meaning that 
CMS attempts to determine the 
average cost for provision of that 
service whether through prospective 
payment for an episode or fee-for-
service-based retrospective payment 
for the actual services provided. 
CMS does not currently consider an 
item or service’s relative 
effectiveness or its cost relative to 
alternative diagnostic and treatment 
options in its pricing. This would 
require a process involving 
considerations similar to that used in 
the coverage process. In short, with 
limited exceptions, Medicare 
currently does not factor a service’s 
relative value to the program or to 
beneficiaries when setting provider 
prices.22  
Conditions of Coverage 
When an NCD is published, rather 
than adopting universal coverage or 
denial of a service, CMS generally 
renders more nuanced judgments on 
coverage that place restrictions based 
on patient clinical characteristics and 
setting of care.23 Coverage policy 
involves more than reviewing the 
rigor of the study design and granting 
a yes or no verdict. Rather, it means 
sifting through the multifaceted 
evidence base; balancing benefits and 
risks; and determining more finely 
when coverage is appropriate for 
which patients, under what 
conditions, and in what settings, with 
consideration of clinician expertise 
and facility requirements.24  
This approach was pioneered in 
Medicare for solid organ 
transplantation in the 1970s. 
 
 
Over the past decade, individuals within the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) and some advocacy organizations have observed 
that the federal government’s processes for regulatory and reimbursement 
decision-making function independently of each other, and that this might 
lead to delays in the clinical adoption of some new health technologies, 
often because payment issues were not recognized until very late in the 
regulatory process or after the product had been approved by the FDA.1 
This has led them to explore the possibility of product developers working 
simultaneously with the FDA and CMS during clinical development.  
Under consideration has been a voluntary FDA-CMS parallel review 
process, in which a Medicare national coverage review would be initiated 
while a specific technology is still undergoing regulatory review. The 
primary goal of parallel review is to shorten the total time required to 
complete FDA and CMS review, while ensuring that health technologies 
are acceptably safe and improve health outcomes for Medicare 
beneficiaries. A joint agency parallel review process could provide 
simultaneous marketing approval by the FDA and national coverage by 
CMS, with all relevant coding and payment issues identified and resolved 
during the review process. Another great potential benefit of this process 
would be the efficient use of the available clinical and scientific expertise 
available in both agencies.  
In September 2010, CMS and the FDA issued a request for public 
comments on what products would be appropriate for parallel review by the 
two agencies, what procedures should be developed, how the parallel 
review process should be implemented, and other issues related to the 
effective operation of the process.  
The comment period ended on December 16, 2010, and this input is 
currently under review. No specific timeline for future action on the parallel 
review process has been announced, though it is expected that one or more 
product developers may request that CMS and the FDA initiate an informal 
version of this process before any further formal plans are developed. 
 
 
FDA-CMS Parallel Review 
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CMS’s deliberation on the NCD for ICDs represents how technically and clinically complicated it can be to measure the 
value of coverage for the most expensive medical technologies. It is also a good example of how scientific uncertainty 
makes it very difficult to have an effective national discourse on such a topic. ICDs are indicated for patients with 
specific levels of heart failure and specific heart rhythm abnormalities and can be lifesaving. The cost to Medicare for 
implantation of the ICD is currently more than $40,000,1 and about 100,000 are implanted annually.1  
Before 2002, CMS had provided coverage for ICDs in patients who had survived a cardiac arrest, had an episode of 
ventricular fibrillation, had an inducible ventricular fibrillation, or had specific genetic abnormalities that placed them at 
high risk for sudden cardiac arrest. New evidence presented in 2002 suggested that an estimated 290,000 additional heart 
failure patients might benefit, leading Guidant, a manufacturer, to request that CMS expand its NCD to cover those 
patients. CMS chose to cover a smaller subgroup of heart failure patients: those with a wide “QRS complex” on the 
electrocardiogram who appeared to have the greatest benefit from ICD placement. This subgroup of patients was 
estimated at 90,000 of the 290,000 Guidant projected for eligibility. In 2005, additional data from another trial suggested 
a benefit in a larger group of patients, and CMS expanded its coverage to that larger group but required data collection 
to ensure only appropriate Medicare patients were being treated. Three ICD manufacturers—Guidant, Medtronic and St. 
Jude Medical—also agreed to assist in developing a registry of ICD users to expand the evidence base for future 
coverage of ICDs. Both these decisions were met with claims of “statistical homicide” and “rationing” from many 
sources. 
The National Cardiovascular Data Registry ICD Registry’s aim was to better identify subgroups of patients who would 
benefit most from ICD implantation. Efforts to secure sufficient funding to use the registry to conduct risk stratifications 
studies continued for more than four years, and the several million dollars needed to do this work has only been recently 
identified. Over this period, Medicare has spent between $10 billion and $15 billion on ICDs, without being able to 
obtain these vital data to inform coverage decisions. In a recent article using physician self-reports, Al-Khatib and 
colleagues1 found that 25 percent of ICDs were implanted in patients who have contraindications to placements. 
Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators 
 
Conditions were set in three 
categories: patients had to meet 
certain clinical indications, only 
trained physicians were authorized to 
perform transplantations, and 
facilities had to be Medicare-
approved and meet particular 
standards. For the most part, 
conditions on coverage did not 
expand beyond transplants until the 
late 1990s, when CMS added similar 
procedures to current transplant 
standards (ventricular assist devices 
in heart transplant facilities), required 
facilities to be Centers of Excellence 
(bariatric surgery), required specific 
facility accreditation (JCAHO 
accreditation for inserting ventricular 
assist devices), and established other 
Medicare-specific standards related 
to clinical indications and clinician 
and facility requirements (ICDs and 
carotid stenting).  
Conditions of coverage have now 
become the norm. Of the 140 NCDs 
CMS completed between 1999 and 
2007, it issued favorable decisions in 
60 percent of the cases, almost 
always with specific conditions.25 
The new technology or procedure 
was covered without any restrictions 
or requirements in only 3 percent of 
coverage decisions. The following 
were the major conditions placed on 
favorable coverage decisions (not 
mutually exclusive): restricted to 
patients with defined disease severity 
(56 percent), coverage only within 
the context of clinical trials or other 
data collection (19 percent), 
diagnostic test restricted by specific 
test threshold (25 percent), restricted 
to patients who failed first-line 
therapy (19 percent), restricted to 
specified treatment regimen or 
interval (17 percent), restricted to 
patients receiving care in specific 
settings (17 percent), and other (16 
percent). Between 2004 and 2007, 
fully 74 percent of favorable 
decisions were restricted to patients 
with defined clinical characteristics. 
Deviations from Conditions 
Unfortunately, placing conditions on 
coverage does not guarantee that 
clinicians will actually adhere to 
those restrictions. A recent study 
measured use of services before and 
after the effective date of specific 
coverage decisions.26 In seven of the 
eight cases, there were no measurable 
changes in use.27 The study authors 
suggested that patients are receiving 
unapproved interventions that may 
not benefit them, but which come 
with a large cost to the program.  
A more recent example involves 
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Medicare coverage of ICDs. As 
discussed in the previous text box, 
expanded coverage of ICDs was 
associated with use of Medicare’s 
coverage with evidence development 
mechanism (discussed below), in this 
case with the establishment of the 
National Cardiovascular Data 
Registry ICD Registry. The 
availability of the registry permitted a 
recent study of the actual practice of 
ICD insertion compared with the 
recommendations in clinical 
guidelines. The study found that 
nearly 25 percent of ICDs were 
placed in patients who had 
contraindications to placement, 
according to the guidelines.28  
In all likelihood, many insertions of 
the ICD also did not meet the 
conditions of the coverage, which 
was designed to protect patients from 
inappropriate use of a complex 
medical device with serious potential 
side effects. The study also found the 
rate of noncompliance with clinical 
criteria for ICD insertions has been 
increasing in recent years. Although 
there need to be exceptions to 
evidence-based criteria that allow 
physicians to individualize care to the 
particular circumstances of patients, 
the ICD experience reveals a broad 
disregard of coverage decisions at a 
large cost to the program. As noted, 
such behavior seems to represent the 
overall experience with current 
conditions of coverage.  
CMS and the administrative 
contractors who review and pay 
claims lack the resources, clinically 
specific information and systems to 
ensure that conditions of coverage 
are actually followed. As a result, 
some beneficiaries receive services 
from which they do not benefit—
along with the associated potential 
harms—at an excessive cost to the 
program.29 In short, coverage with 
conditions could positively guide use 
to support the Triple Aim. However, 
because they can be simply ignored 
by clinicians, the approach falls short 
of its potential.  
Prior Authorization 
Another potential approach that 
could help assure that patients 
receive appropriate care would be 
selective use of prior authorization 
for particular services. CMS has 
limited ability to review and recover 
payment that should not have been 
made when provided services were 
not appropriate and did not meet 
coverage conditions. Prior 
authorization would remove the need 
to deny payment after resources have 
already been committed.30  
Yet, prior authorization has a mixed 
record of performance as 
administered by commercial insurers 
and has raised concerns about 
intrusion into care. If performed by 
Medicare, prior authorization should 
be narrowly applied and targeted to 
the application of technology and 
services that meet most or all of the 
following criteria: (1) have high unit 
cost; (2) are performed relatively 
infrequently; (3) are elective, such 
that the time to conduct the review 
would not affect patient outcomes; 
(4) rely on clinical judgment based 
largely on objective, validated and 
easily retrievable information; (5) 
have associated evidence of or reason 
to expect significant variations in 
use; and (6) would benefit from a 
review process to support quality as 
well as prudent use of resources.31 As 
with the overall goal of Medicare 
coverage, the application of prior 
authorization would be based on the 
current, best scientific evidence. 
Although questions have been raised 
about whether the Medicare statute 
provides a basis for prior 
authorization, CMS, in fact, engaged 
in prior authorization in the 1980s. 
Peer review organizations (now 
called quality improvement 
organizations) were required to 
perform prior authorization for 10 
medical and surgical procedures, 
including cataract extractions and 
carotid endarterectomies.32 The 
approach was abandoned because it 
was not successful, not because of 
lack of statutory authority. This 
earlier experience with prior 
authorization suggests the need for 
caution in adopting it as a way to 
improve the appropriate application 
of technology in Medicare.  
Yet, the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Committee (MEDPAC) recently 
recommended the targeted use of 
prior authorization for office-based 
referrals for advanced imaging tests, 
relying in part on the reported 
success of the approach by 
commercial insurers in recent 
years.33 Of note, the MEDPAC 
recommendations would apply prior 
authorization outside the coverage-
making process for new services; the 
advanced imaging services to which 
it would apply prior authorization 
have long been covered for broad use 
in Medicare.  
In summary, CMS routinely reviews 
available evidence as a guide to 
making coverage determinations and 
usually places restrictions on 
approved coverage based on patient 
characteristics or other factors. Yet, 
largely because of a lack of resources 
and systems, the clinical criteria 
accompanying coverage are often 
ignored by providers, sometimes to 
the detriment of patient well-being 
and at increased cost to the program. 
With additional resources, CMS and 
its administrative contractors could 
better monitor compliance with 
evidence-based coverage policies and 
be in a better position to implement 
additional approaches, such as 
selective application of prior 
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authorization, to permit more 
appropriate use of costly technical 
services.  
Comparative Effectiveness Research  
Controversy continues around the 
role comparative effectiveness 
research (CER) should play in 
Medicare coverage and payment 
policy. The inclusion of funding for 
CER in both the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and 
the ACA encountered stiff 
opposition. Opponents argue that the 
use of CER could lead to rationing, 
and that federal funding might 
supplant private investment in 
clinical research. There was 
considerable push back to maintain 
patient and professional choice about 
treatment options. Some of the 
debate focused on whether and how 
often Medicare should use the 
information produced from federally 
funded comparative effectiveness 
research to deny coverage for its 
beneficiaries.34  
Although CER has been variously 
defined,35 most definitions recognize 
the following features: 
• The research compares two or 
more alternatives. 
• The focus is on relative 
effectiveness, or how alternative 
approaches work in practice, as 
opposed to relative efficacy, or 
how they work under ideal 
conditions. 
• The goal is to produce findings 
that would help patients, 
clinicians, purchasers and policy-
makers make informed decisions 
about health care choices, with 
the ultimate aim to improve 
patient outcomes. 
The emphasis on producing findings 
that are relevant to decision-makers, 
including patients, clinicians and 
payers like Medicare, is a 
fundamental aspect of CER, implying 
the research should be useful for 
making sound coverage and payment 
policy, as well as other clinical and 
health policy decisions. As cited 
earlier, current Medicare coverage 
and payment policies are often made 
without strong evidence, often 
relying on a small number of poorly 
designed studies. Many studies lack 
any head-to-head comparisons with 
other treatment options and are 
conducted on too few patients or 
limited to too few centers or 
physicians to be able to draw valid 
conclusions that are generalizable to 
Medicare. Further, studies do not 
consistently examine the benefits and 
harms in a Medicare-relevant 
population.  
As an illustration of how coverage 
policies are developed now, without 
evidence of comparative 
effectiveness, Medicare began paying 
for intensity modulated radiation 
therapy (IMRT) in 2002, essentially 
doubling prostate cancer treatment 
costs for those undergoing radiation 
therapy with little evidence about its 
relative effectiveness compared to 
existing standard care 
(brachytherapy).36 Within six years, 
one-third of Medicare prostate cancer 
patients were receiving IMRT, and 
Medicare was spending 
approximately $1 billion a year on 
that therapeutic approach,37 still 
without evidence of its comparative 
effectiveness. Recently, CMS opted 
to defer to local coverage policies 
rather than issue a national coverage 
determination on payment for a new 
alternative treatment, proton beam 
therapy. Once again, there was 
insufficient evidence on which to 
draw conclusions about its relative 
effectiveness38 while, once more, 
treatment costs would potentially 
double.39  
In another example, two high-quality 
randomized clinical trials were 
published in 2009 demonstrating that 
vertebroplasty for vertebral 
compression fractures (putting bone 
cement into a fractured vertebra 
through a skin incision to stabilize 
the spine) produced similar clinical 
outcomes to the simple local 
injection of anesthetic.40 Such 
compelling results might reasonably 
have triggered a reconsideration of 
Medicare’s existing policy on this 
procedure, which was essentially that 
regional administrative contractors 
could allow reimbursement for 
vertebroplasty with few restrictions. 
However, no such policy review was 
ever initiated, and the use of this 
procedure remains quite common in 
the Medicare program.  
Patient-specific concerns have been 
raised that CER is oriented to 
producing evidence for an “average” 
patient, thereby neglecting important 
individual characteristics and patient 
preferences. However, in the prostate 
cancer example, CER could have 
helped Medicare better understand 
specific subsets of the population 
who might have benefited from 
IMRT, compared with the standard 
of brachytherapy. The agency 
considered restricting the use of the 
new technologies to those not likely 
to respond to brachytherapy but 
lacked the evidence basis to make 
this judgment. As physicians who 
own the radiation equipment stand to 
benefit financially from its use, there 
are strong incentives for 
inappropriate or overuse of IMRT, as 
has been recently reported.41 
Relevant comparative effectiveness 
research would also have provided 
information for physicians and 
patients to make better informed 
choices about which of the various 
treatment approaches to follow.  
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The ACA’s establishment of the 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research 
Institute (PCORI), which is devoted 
to CER, and the increased interest by 
the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) to fund such studies offer the 
potential to support the types of 
research and infrastructure that could 
strengthen evidence-based coverage 
and payment policies within 
Medicare. Further, the ACA’s 
statutory language does not prevent 
Medicare from considering CER 
studies generated by PCORI or other 
researchers for making coverage 
decisions, although it does impose 
some restrictions. Decision-making 
must be done in an “iterative and 
transparent process, that includes 
public comment and considers the 
effect on subpopulations” and cannot 
solely be based on CER results. 
Neither of these restrictions is 
inconsistent with the process 
Medicare currently uses for coverage 
decisions. Medicare is also prohibited 
from using results of CER in a 
manner that discounts the value of 
extending the lives of elderly or 
disabled persons relative to others, or 
uses a specific threshold for cost per 
quality-adjusted life year (QALY), a 
common metric in cost-effectiveness 
analysis. 
Although Medicare would benefit 
greatly from relevant CER, the 
program’s ability to influence CER 
priorities or the methods used in CER 
is limited. The agency does not have 
a seat on the PCORI Governing 
Board or Methodology Committee, 
which are charged with determining 
research priorities and 
methodological standards for CER, 
respectively. Clinical issues of 
importance to the elderly and 
disabled populations Medicare 
serves, especially related to chronic 
health conditions, appear to be 
inadequately emphasized by 
Governing Board members and 
external stakeholders called upon to 
voice their views about research 
priorities.  
Medicare policy-makers face specific 
questions that timely and targeted 
CER could help answer, such as what 
is the relative benefit of using 
erythropoiesis-stimulating agents for 
chronic kidney disease or whether 
left ventricular assist devices should 
be used for “destination” therapy 
rather than as a bridge to heart 
transplants.42 Yet, past efforts by 
CMS to influence NIH’s research 
agenda to be more relevant to its 
needs and to the Triple Aim have not 
been consistently successful.  
Currently, once FDA approval has 
been received, Medicare typically 
uses available evidence to make 
coverage policy. However, the 
available evidence often does not 
satisfy Medicare’s expectations to 
help them make these decisions.43 To 
generate the evidence desired to 
make these coverage decisions, 
studies done for regulatory approval 
should be designed to better address 
questions of importance to CMS. In 
addition, this type of evidence will 
sometimes be most appropriately 
collected under provisional coverage 
arrangements. 
In short, CMS’s coverage process has 
long been committed to thorough 
evaluation of available comparative 
effectiveness research. A major 
problem is that there are significant 
gaps in the available evidence bases, 
particularly as related to seniors and 
disabled beneficiaries in Medicare. A 
national commitment to CER could 
help fill evidence gaps to reduce the 
current overreliance on “fair” and 
“poor” evidence as the basis for CMS 
deciding whether to provide coverage 
for new services and new clinical 
indications for established services.  
Coverage with Evidence 
Development  
Coverage with evidence development 
(CED) is a policy tool that links 
coverage of a technology with a 
requirement that patients receiving 
the service are enrolled in 
prospective clinical studies to inform 
future revisions to the coverage 
decision. The term was coined 
specifically for Medicare44 but is 
now part of a growing array of 
options for insurers to share in the 
costs of data collection in order to 
support their collective interest in 
reducing uncertainty when making 
coverage decisions.45 Under CED, 
Medicare reimbursement is 
contingent on a beneficiary’s 
participation in a clinical study as 
part of a systematic data gathering 
exercise. Opponents argue that CED 
raises the threshold of evidence 
needed to obtain a positive coverage 
determination and slows access to 
medical advances. In face of the 
limited information on which 
Medicare now makes its coverage 
determinations, CED provides a 
mechanism for Medicare’s views on 
study design to be considered in the 
development of clinical research 
protocols, such as ensuring the study 
enrolls a patient population reflective 
of Medicare beneficiaries or uses 
outcomes of relevance to Medicare 
beneficiaries.  
CED remains a promising idea and 
its implementation has been done 
with great diligence, but there are 
still few unequivocally successful 
examples of CED leading to the 
generation of the type of relevant and 
reliable evidence originally 
envisioned. Although Medicare has 
applied CED in more than a dozen 
national coverage decisions in the 
past 15 years, data from the resultant 
studies have been used for policy in 
only two cases: for lung volume 
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reduction surgery to treat late-stage 
emphysema in 2003 and the use of 
positron emission tomography (PET) 
for cancer in 2009. In both cases, 
Medicare made positive coverage 
policies that have been viewed as 
more permissive than was justified 
by the evidence generated from the 
studies.46 In many other cases, 
appropriate studies were never 
designed, funded or implemented for 
various reasons. In short, the promise 
of CED as a mechanism to support 
clinical research on urgent topics has 
not yet been realized. 
Operational Problems 
Even when launched, many CED 
studies have had significant design 
flaws; received insufficient funding; 
lacked adequate data collection 
systems; or, for other reasons, have 
not produced the scientifically 
rigorous data needed to formulate 
sound coverage policy. For example, 
the National Oncologic PET 
Registry, which was developed to 
inform coverage policy on the use of 
fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG)-PET 
scans for diagnosing, staging and 
monitoring response to oncology 
treatment, relied on physician self-
reports to determine whether the 
imaging changed their clinical 
approach to treatment practice. But 
physicians’ financial interest in the 
study outcome may have influenced 
their behavior, undermining the value 
of the information gathered.47 Some 
of these limitations are being 
addressed in the next generation of 
this registry, though there are no 
published results to date from this 
initiative. The National Cardiac Data 
Registry, which was developed to 
inform coverage policy on the 
appropriate use of ICDs, did not 
begin to gather critical data on device 
firing—a main outcome of interest 
for Medicare—until five years after 
the registry was launched.  
The limited impact of CED as 
implemented by Medicare is not the 
result of inherent flaws in the concept 
of CED. Rather, the major barrier 
seems to be the absence of a clear 
statutory foundation for CED. A 
difficult aspect of using the 
“reasonable and necessary” authority 
to implement CED is that CMS 
decision memos have considered 
“reasonable and necessary” to mean 
that there is “adequate evidence to 
conclude that the item or service 
improves health outcomes.”48 If the 
purpose of CED is to generate that 
“adequate evidence,” then the item or 
service cannot be reasonable and 
necessary under the standard 
statutory authority. Thus, Medicare 
currently relies upon the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality’s 
(AHRQ) legal authority to conduct 
research with respect to the 
outcomes, effectiveness and 
appropriateness of health care 
services and procedures for the 
Medicare population.49 
Although CMS has issued guidance 
attempting to clarify the authorities 
for CED,50 each application has 
involved much internal legal debate. 
Without a clear legal mandate to 
pursue CED, CMS’s efforts have by 
necessity been ad hoc, with no formal 
process for selecting appropriate 
topics; little learning from one 
initiative to the next; and limited 
resources and lack of dedicated staff 
skilled in navigating the political and 
operational issues raised by CED, 
including CMS’s ability to require 
provider and supplier compliance 
with CED reporting requirements. 
This experience has dampened 
CMS’s enthusiasm for pursuing this 
policy tool, as it requires 
considerable staff time and resources 
just to get approval, resulting in the 
failure to apply the policy for 
technologies that would most benefit 
from additional study.  
Another major barrier is the lack of 
resources for supporting studies the 
agency feels are important. Several 
CED policies have failed because 
NIH or other sources to support 
studies were not forthcoming in a 
timely fashion, if at all. Overcoming 
these limitations and creating a well-
crafted, consistent policy framework 
is possible, but it will likely require 
senior-level policy support for CED 
in the HHS, specific statutory 
authority from Congress, and a 
dedicated funding stream to support 
the nonclinical costs of the 
research.51  
Coverage with evidence development 
is a potentially important coverage 
tool in that it permits beneficiaries to 
receive services when evidence on 
effectiveness is lacking, while 
contributing to developing an 
adequate evidence base on which 
more definitive coverage decisions 
can be made subsequently. For 
practical reasons, the approach has 
not been effectively implemented. 
Perhaps most important is the need 
for a clear statutory foundation for 
coverage with evidence development.  
Costs and Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis 
Having the ability to somehow weigh 
costs in making coverage decisions is 
an area that is appealing to policy-
makers. Clinical experts have 
suggested that sometimes new, 
expensive technologies offer little or 
no benefit to beneficiaries yet are 
very costly to Medicare.52 For a 
program under fiscal pressure, even 
proven but limited benefits of a new 
technology may be viewed by some 
as insufficient to justify a large 
increase in spending.  
The Medicare statute does not 
explicitly address costs, thus leaving 
room for ambiguity concerning 
legislative intent. While Medicare 
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currently does not formally consider 
costs in making coverage 
determinations, as a practical matter, 
costly new technologies receive 
comparatively greater scrutiny than 
other devices, procedures and 
services.53  
In a recent example, the pivotal 
clinical trial of sipuleucel-T 
(Provenge) for use in hormone-
refractory, metastatic prostate cancer 
demonstrated an improved survival 
of 4.1 months compared to placebo.54 
Studies comparing outcomes or side 
effects to other treatment alternatives 
have not been done. Yet, CMS 
reasonably undertook an NCD on this 
new therapy in early 2010 and 
convened a MEDCAC panel meeting 
in November 2010 to provide 
additional guidance. The panel 
suggested that evidence was 
sufficient to determine that 
sipuleucel-T was beneficial for its 
on-label use, but absence of evidence 
prevented it from drawing 
conclusions for off-label uses. In its 
final decision released on June 30, 
2011, CMS affirmed the panel’s 
recommendation.55 Priced at $31,000 
per treatment, with a usual course of 
three treatments, sipuleucel-T is one 
of the most expensive cancer 
therapies on the market. As is 
customary in NCDs, CMS did not 
consider the increased program costs 
as part of its evidence review.56  
Failed Rule-Making 
Two administrations, one Republican 
and one Democrat, have proposed 
substantive rules that articulated how 
the agency would consider costs in 
the context of broader proposed rules 
that provided detailed guidance to the 
coverage process.57 The first attempt 
to provide long-sought clarification 
of CMS’s legal authority in the 
coverage area and to provide 
substantive criteria to guide how 
coverage would be made took place 
in proposed rules issued in 1989, as 
one of the last official acts of the 
Reagan administration. Those 
proposed rules described how cost-
effectiveness analysis would be used 
in considering new items and 
services. They were criticized by 
some stakeholders, including the 
device manufacture industry trade 
association, as being the “foundation 
for rationing.”58 The final regulations 
were never issued.  
A decade later in 2000, during the 
Clinton administration, CMS issued a 
notice of intent (NOI) to publish a 
proposed rule in which it did not 
mention cost-effectiveness per se, but 
the concept of “added value.” The 
standards would have required that 
new technologies provide some 
benefit to beneficiaries beyond what 
was already available to them in the 
program. If a technology did not 
provide added value, Medicare would 
deny coverage. Clearly, 
considerations of the costs of 
alternative diagnosis and treatment 
modalities were being advanced as 
relevant to determining coverage. 
Again, a large number of negative 
comments on this notice of intent 
persuaded HHS and CMS to 
withdraw this proposal, and no 
further attempt has been made to 
address these issues through 
regulation.  
In a number of ways, Congress has 
actually made CMS’s interest in 
considering costs in coverage more 
difficult, suggesting that these 
occasional efforts to develop national 
policies that explicitly address costs 
or cost-effectiveness have in fact 
resulted in policy moving in the 
opposite direction.59 For example, 
when CMS attempted to pay a single 
rate for products deemed “clinically 
equivalent,” Congress expressly 
prohibited the agency from any 
future use of this equivalence 
standard involving payments to 
hospital outpatient departments. 
Given this record, both the 
Congressional Budget Office60 and 
the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission61 have recently asserted 
that regardless of legal interpretation 
of the current statute, CMS would 
require clear statutory authority to 
formally consider costs in its 
coverage policies.  
That authority is unlikely to be given, 
at least in the short term. As 
discussed earlier, ACA prohibited 
Medicare from using a specific 
threshold for a cost per quality-
adjusted life year, a standard 
technique in cost-effectiveness 
analyses, in making reimbursement 
and coverage decisions.62 It also 
limited PCORI from determining 
cost-effectiveness using this 
technique.63 In addition, limitations 
were placed on the ways comparative 
effectiveness research could be used.  
A number of methodological issues 
make reliance on CEA using 
calculation of cost per QALY 
problematic for making coverage 
policy in Medicare.64 There is 
controversy over how accurately 
QALYs reflect societal values around 
issues of distributive justice and 
equity65 and about individual 
preferences for health care.66 The 
National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE), part of 
the National Health Service in the 
United Kingdom, does use thresholds 
of cost for QALYs to make coverage 
determinations. However, even then, 
NICE has established a 30-member 
citizens’ council as a way to 
incorporate public views into its 
appraisal process to temper reliance 
on only the QALY calculation in 
some situations.67  
NICE makes exceptions in certain 
cases, such as end-of-life care or care 
for small populations with incurable 
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illnesses, allowing for consideration 
of coverage where the cost per 
QALY exceeds the threshold range.68 
Further, the United Kingdom has 
recently proposed that future yes or 
no recommendations by NICE will 
not be strictly based on cost per 
QALY thresholds but will instead 
move toward value-based pricing.69 
For any application in Medicare, 
some suggest that formal CEA using 
QALYs should constitute one piece 
of data to inform decisions, but not to 
determine coverage. Countries other 
than the United Kingdom use CEA in 
this less formal, informational 
manner.70  
Clearly, CMS is precluded from 
formal use of comparative 
effectiveness analysis, such as using 
approaches like calculating QALYs. 
Indeed, even the United Kingdom, 
which does formally use comparative 
effectiveness analysis in its coverage 
process, recognizes some limitations 
in relying solely on QALYs. The 
question for Medicare is whether 
costs should be considered in any 
way in the coverage process, 
recognizing that some new 
technologies or expanded application 
of existing technologies are very 
costly and provide little or no 
apparent benefit compared with other 
available diagnosis and treatment 
modalities.  
Least Costly Alternative as 
a Cost-Containment 
Strategy  
As noted earlier, CMS generally does 
not attempt to factor an item or 
service’s relative effectiveness or its 
cost compared to alternatives in 
setting the amount to be covered.71 
When CMS set the payment rate for a 
new anti-anemia drug equal to the 
rate for an existing drug on the 
grounds that the products were 
“functionally equivalent” in their 
clinical impact on patients, Congress 
expressly prohibited the agency from 
doing so.  
However, local contractors have been 
highly selectively adjusting prices 
based on clinical effectiveness 
evidence for more than 15 years. This 
has been through their use of a least 
costly alternative (LCA) policy for 
certain types of items, including 
durable medical equipment and Part 
B drugs.72 The policy’s rationale is 
that Medicare, beneficiaries and 
taxpayers should not pay more for a 
service when a similar service can be 
used to treat the same condition and 
produce the same outcome at a lower 
cost.73  
Using this reference pricing 
approach, Medicare contractors have 
not paid the added cost of a more 
expensive service if a clinically 
comparable one exists in particular 
categories of items and services. 
Examples include manual 
wheelchairs, power mobility devices, 
seat lift mechanisms, supplies for 
tracheostomy care and anti-androgen 
drugs for patients with advanced 
prostate cancer.74 Beneficiaries are 
allowed to obtain the more costly 
item if they choose to pay the 
difference between the approved 
payment amount for the reference 
item and the amount for the one they 
choose.  
There is no statutory provision giving 
specific authority or prohibiting the 
application of LCA. Again, CMS has 
considered the “reasonable and 
necessary” statutory language to 
provide the needed authority to adopt 
this approach for equivalent drugs 
and equipment. However, a recent 
court decision constrains Medicare’s 
current use of LCA determinations. 
In a case involving LCA for 
inhalation drugs for asthma, the court 
found that because Congress did not 
specifically authorize LCA, CMS 
could not use its broad reasonable 
and necessary authority to do so for 
drugs.75 In short, the court ruled that 
the specific payment policies 
contained in statute preempted the 
general statutory language on which 
it had been relying.  
As a result of the court action, it 
appears that Medicare’s 
administrative contractors have 
retired some LCA policies that were 
constraining spending, including the 
policy for paying the same for all 
anti-androgen drugs. As with the 
issue of whether CMS can consider 
costs in any way when making 
coverage determination, it appears 
again that the agency needs explicit 
legislative authority to engage in 
reference pricing policies such as 
LCA, at least for drugs. CMS has 
continued to apply LCA for durable 
medical equipment, which was not 
addressed in recent legislation. 
Expanded Use of LCA 
 In a recent paper, Pearson and Bach 
promoted an even more robust use of 
an LCA approach in Medicare.76 In 
their proposal, after a suitable period 
needed for producing the requisite 
evidence, a service judged to be 
clinically comparable to its most 
relevant covered alternative would be 
assigned a payment level equal to the 
alternative. That is, rather than pay 
based on the actual cost plus a 
modest profit as Medicare does now, 
services with equivalent clinical 
effectiveness would be paid the 
reference price. 
This proposal would go far beyond 
the LCA application CMS had been 
using until enjoined by the court, 
which involved very closely related 
products. The Pearson-Bach proposal 
goes further by considering certain 
interventions clinically equivalent 
even though they may be very 
different on a number of other 
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parameters, such as their mode of 
administration, biological 
mechanisms of action and patient 
preferences.  
Continuing the example of prostate 
cancer, a longstanding alternative to 
anti-androgen drugs is orchiectomy, 
or removal of the testes to remove the 
production of androgens. Evidence 
suggests that this surgical approach is 
more effective than anti-androgen 
drugs with fewer side effects, and, if 
analyzed over a sufficiently long 
period, less costly.77 Yet, while 
producing a comparable effect on 
reducing testosterone levels, the 
surgical removal of testes is 
obviously not equivalent to the use of 
drugs—certainly not from a patient 
perspective. Further, determining the 
pricing equivalence comparing a one-
time, relatively high-unit cost service 
to a repetitive, lower-unit cost service 
would be quite challenging.  
At the very least, a distinction would 
seem appropriate for different 
diagnostic and treatment modalities, 
such as surgery, chemotherapy, 
radiation therapy, etc., as the 2000 
NOI proposed. However, extending 
the concept of equivalence, for 
example, to different drugs with the 
same biological effect but different 
routes or frequency of administration 
might also be a reasonable approach 
for application of LCA in cases 
where the pricing differences are 
substantial.  
Discussion and 
Recommendations 
CMS has recently emphasized its 
programmatic Triple Aim as 
improving patients’ experience of 
care, improving the health of a 
population and slowing the rise in per 
capita costs—an approach that 
reflects similar objectives inherent in 
the concept of value-based 
purchasing. Value-based purchasing 
emphasizes the desire to obtain 
higher quality with more prudent 
and, likely, lower spending.  
To support value-based purchasing, 
Congress and CMS have emphasized 
measurement of provider 
performance and have begun to 
modify payment approaches to better 
align payment with demonstrated 
provider quality and efficiency. 
However, the leading cause of 
increased health spending78—
adoption of new technology and 
increased use of existing 
technology—has not been a 
prominent focus of value-based 
purchasing initiatives, nor has there 
been any recent movement by 
Medicare to directly address the 
health effects or costs associated with 
the use of new technologies. In fact, 
Congress has occasionally challenged 
attempts by CMS to make coverage 
decisions based on a careful appraisal 
of available scientific evidence from 
peer-reviewed clinical journals, 
creating a very cautious environment 
at CMS. Further, CMS and its 
regional administrative contractors 
lack sufficient resources and will to 
appropriately implement the 
coverage decisions they do make.  
As a result, some items and services 
that do not benefit Medicare patients 
are provided, often at high cost to the 
program, while other services that 
would improve patient health and 
well-being are underused, with no 
clear incentives to promote their 
adoption. The implication is that 
addressing some of the current 
programmatic deficiencies in 
coverage policy could improve care 
while reducing program spending.  
ACA established the controversial 
Independent Payment Advisory 
Board (IPAB) to hold Medicare 
spending within legislated limits, 
with Congress required to either 
accept the board’s proposals or come 
up with alternatives that achieve 
similar savings. If no legislative 
action is taken, the IPAB’s 
recommendations would take 
effect.79 Because of its specific 
legislative charter, policy analysts 
expect IPAB to focus mostly on 
payment rates and payment methods, 
not coverage policies and procedures. 
IPAB is specifically prohibited from 
making recommendations that would 
result in “rationing” of care, although 
the term is not defined in statute, and 
is also prohibited from making 
recommendations that would limit 
benefits. Some opponents of IPAB 
would surely argue that changes in 
how Medicare considers approval for 
coverage of new technology at least 
constitutes limiting benefits, if not 
overt rationing. In short, it is unlikely 
that IPAB, even if it survives current 
political efforts to prevent its 
creation, will play a significant role 
in supporting a stronger coverage 
process at CMS and the 
administrative contractors.  
Nevertheless, Medicare’s recent 
commitment to improving the patient 
experience of care and health 
outcomes at lower per capita cost 
could be more effectively supported 
through Medicare coverage policy by 
considering the following 
recommendations. These are 
organized based on their potential 
ability to improve the Medicare 
program and by the practical 
feasibility of adoption. 
1.  Improvements to the current 
CMS coverage policy approach  
CMS has become increasingly 
reluctant to use its existing 
“reasonable and necessary” statutory 
authority to make or modify national 
coverage decisions even when based 
on very high-quality evidence. The 
agency should seriously explore the 
policy and legal concerns behind this 
trend. As discussed earlier, even 
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when the agency had strong scientific 
evidence that casts doubt on the 
effectiveness of a technology or 
service to improve patient health and 
well-being, it did not move forward, 
partly because of a political 
environment that makes such 
evidence-based policy-making a 
target for affected stakeholders.  
The MEDCAC could help CMS craft 
a more systematic approach to 
identifying topics for review as 
national coverage determinations. 
For CMS to become more active in 
reviewing technologies, it would be 
necessary to augment the size and 
expertise of the staff that conducts 
clinical and scientific reviews, most 
of whom are housed in the Coverage 
and Analysis Group. Additional 
resources would also be important to 
permit the agency and its contractors 
to monitor compliance with the 
clinical conditions described in local 
and national coverage decisions.  
Selective use of prior authorization 
for high-cost items with 
demonstrated inappropriate use 
should also be considered as a way to 
improve adherence to evidence-based 
coverage conditions. If the additional 
resources were provided with 
accountability for their use, it is 
likely that the increased 
administrative costs would be more 
than offset with program savings 
resulting from reduction of services 
that do not benefit—or actually 
harm—Medicare beneficiaries. 
Medicare could also use its existing 
coverage authority to more actively 
conduct national coverage reviews of 
new technologies that are likely to 
provide important health benefits for 
Medicare beneficiaries. While CMS 
took this approach with national 
coverage of smoking cessation 
therapy, there have been few other 
examples to date of specific high-
value technologies being promoted 
through the coverage process, and no 
current policy strategy or mechanism 
exists to pursue this approach. 
CMS should expand the use of 
national coverage decisions to 
actively promote adoption of high-
value technologies that are 
underused, including interventions 
that may help reduce the need for 
costly subsequent interventions. 
CMS should seek opportunities to 
promote delivery system innovations 
that will be tested through the Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovations that could be facilitated 
through NCDs on individual items 
and services that might be included 
in those demonstration programs.  
With the advice of the MEDCAC, 
CMS could identify important needs 
and current gaps in services in the 
Medicare program to better support 
care for elderly and disabled 
beneficiaries, sending clear signals to 
product developers and providers 
about high-impact areas for 
investment to develop new products 
and services.  
It would also be worth conducting a 
more careful review of the regional 
and local coverage process in order 
to identify how this critical aspect of 
Medicare coverage policy is 
conducted. Given the significant 
impact of these decisions and the 
uptake of new health care 
technologies, the effect of any 
proposed changes in national 
coverage policy will depend in part 
on a robust, consistent and evidence-
based regional process with sufficient 
resources to monitor provider 
compliance. 
2.  Systematic approach to 
promoting high-priority research 
Medicare’s ability to develop 
evidence-based coverage policy is 
severely restricted by its relatively 
limited capacity to ensure that its 
research priorities are weighed 
seriously in the allocation of public 
research funds. CMS has no budget 
to support clinical research. 
Additionally, the major public 
funders of research have little interest 
in ensuring that Medicare’s 
programmatic needs are significant 
factors in the scientific review 
process.  
CMS could make more deliberate use 
of the MEDCAC to help identify 
critical research priorities and then 
provide these recommendations to 
NIH, AHRQ, PCORI and private-
sector research funders for 
consideration. Agencies within the 
federal government, including NIH in 
particular, should be more attentive 
to the practical needs of CMS for 
comparative effectiveness research 
relevant to the Medicare program. In 
addition to developing a process to 
articulate these research priorities, it 
will be necessary to establish HHS 
policies or other policy mechanisms 
to ensure that at least some CMS 
clinical research questions are given 
higher priority. Otherwise, the poor 
quality of evidence currently 
hampering Medicare’s ability to 
make evidence-based clinical policy 
will continue. 
3. New statutory authority 
Three specific statutory changes 
would contribute significantly to 
Medicare’s ability to use the 
coverage process more effectively.  
First, it would be useful to establish 
explicit legal authority that would 
allow CMS to apply “coverage with 
evidence development” to promising 
technologies that are particularly 
important to Medicare beneficiaries 
and require better evidence to answer 
important questions about their 
clinical effectiveness. The current 
authority is sufficiently ambiguous to 
prevent CMS from fully developing 
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and implementing coverage with 
evidence development consistently 
and systematically. The historical 
difficulty in addressing coverage 
policy through legislation and 
regulation suggests that statutory 
refinements will be challenging, 
though clearly critical to achieving 
essential programmatic goals. 
Second, Congress should restore and 
expand Medicare’s authority to apply 
LCA pricing to products that are 
similar in their biological and/or 
physical characteristics and that 
achieve comparable clinical 
outcomes. 
Finally, statutory changes will be 
necessary to allow Medicare to 
explicitly consider costs as part of the 
national coverage process. This will 
almost certainly require explicit 
statutory authority, given the clear 
evidence that past efforts to 
accomplish this through regulatory 
action have been stymied. 
Consideration of costs should not be 
based on the formal cost-
effectiveness analysis as embodied in 
QALY calculations. Instead, CMS 
should be allowed to deny coverage 
and/or reduce the pricing for 
technologies that provide health 
outcomes comparable to already 
covered, but less costly, technologies. 
More difficult to address will be 
technologies that provide small 
incremental benefits at significantly 
higher prices. In such cases, 
Congress may need to consider new 
pricing authorities for Medicare that 
allow CMS to link prices to 
incremental benefits. This approach 
will be necessary until payment 
reforms have been successfully 
implemented that create financial 
incentives for providers and/or 
patients to have some sensitivity to 
the relative benefits and costs of the 
technologies being used. 
Conclusion 
As the Medicare program enters a 
new phase of rapid evolution 
following the passage of ACA, many 
new programs, demonstrations, pilots 
and policies are being pursued, all of 
which aim to improve the individual 
experience of care, improve the 
health of populations and reduce per 
capita costs of care. There is 
substantial room to improve the 
implementation of existing policy 
processes to achieve these aims, 
particularly with respect to Medicare 
coverage policy. Much can be 
achieved by more deliberate use of 
existing authorities and procedures, 
and further substantial gains would 
result from ACA’s additional 
clarifications of CMS’s authority. 
Although the main focus of Medicare 
reform has been to shift Medicare 
away from the underlying fee-for-
service payment approach, 
significant benefits to the program 
and Medicare beneficiaries could 
also result from the improvements in 
CMS’s activities in determining and 
implementing coverage of services 
that are recommended in this report. 
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